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1. Introduction
Fodor (2007; 2008) holds that the very early stages of perceptual processing 
operate upon non-conceptual representations.1 In my view, this position is 
incompatible with the main tenets that Fodor himself (1975; 1998a; 1998b; 
2001a) has largely defended in his computational theory of mind (CTM). 
According to CTM, a cognitive process is a computational process that 
involves the manipulation of semantically interpretable strings of symbols 
which are processed according to algorithms (Fodor, 1997; Pinker, 1999; 
Rey, 1997). My aim in this paper is to address the conflicting relationship 
between Fodor’s notion of “non-conceptual representation” and his CTM. 
For this purpose, I will offer a trilemma in which I present some of the 
problems CTM would face if the modules involved in perceptual process-
ing computed non-conceptual representations. 
The first horn of the trilemma consists of the possibility that perceptual 
modules operate on both non-conceptual representations and representations 
of the language of thought (LOT).2 According to Fodor (1975; 2008), LOT 
1 Notice that Fodor (2008) uses expressions such as “preconceptual,” 
“unconceptualized,” and “non-conceptual” representations. These expressions are 
not interchangeable, however. There are differences between a “preconceptual” 
representation and a “non-conceptual” one. While the former can become 
conceptual (in the sense of Prinz, 2002), the latter will never become a conceptual 
representation. I prefer to use “non-conceptual representation” because, as we will 
see, Fodor’s iconic representations do not have the characteristics necessary to 
become conceptual representations.
2 The expression “perceptual module” alludes to perceptual processing systems 
such as visual and auditory systems. As output, these modules produce perceptual 
representations used for a variety of cognitive purposes. Fodor (1983) describes 
nine properties of these perceptual module systems. Modular systems are localized, 
meaning that the modules are realized in dedicated neural architecture. Modular 
systems are subject to characteristic breakdowns, as modules can be selectively 
impaired. They are mandatory since modules operate in an automatic way. 
Modules are fast; they generate outputs quickly. They are also shallow; modules 
have relatively simple outputs (e.g., not judgments). In addition, modules are 
ontogenetically determined, developing at a characteristic pace and sequence. 
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is an internal language-like representational format in which the mind rep-
resents concepts. Since LOT representations have combinatorial syntax and 
semantics, they can be manipulated by the classical computational processes 
of the mind postulated by CTM. In contrast, non-conceptual representations 
do not have these properties and therefore cannot figure in a classical com-
putational process. For this reason, Fodor would have to accept that part 
of the processing of the perceptual modules cannot be explained by CTM. 
The second horn of the trilemma represents the possibility that perceptual 
modules may only compute non-conceptual representations. This would be 
a worst-case scenario for Fodor, since CTM would then not explain how 
perceptual modules work. This conclusion is at odds with the main tenets 
of CTM, which attempts to provide a theory of modular processing. Finally, 
the last horn of the trilemma presents a third possibility in which perceptual 
modules operate on both non-conceptual representations and representations 
that are not full-blown LOT. I will argue that this position is inadequate in 
that it presents the same difficulties mentioned in the first and second horns 
of the trilemma.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will present Fodor’s 
position on the conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate. The way in which 
Fodor distinguishes between conceptual and non-conceptual representations 
determines how he conceives of non-conceptual ones. I will then discuss 
in some detail Fodor’s notion of “non-conceptual representation” followed 
by his argument that the early stages of perceptual processing operate upon 
non-conceptual representations. The general purpose of this section is to 
analyze Fodor’s defense of non-conceptualism which has emerged in his 
most recent works. With these preliminaries in place, in Section 3, I will 
introduce my trilemma against Fodor. This section will be divided into three 
subsections in order to develop each horn of the trilemma. I will conclude 
with some comments about the tension between Fodor’s classical computa-
Modular systems are also domain specific, coping with a restricted class of inputs. 
They are inaccessible, as higher levels of processing have limited access to the 
representations within a module. Finally, modular systems are informationally 
encapsulated, that is, modules cannot be guided by information at higher levels of 
processing.
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tionalism and his non-conceptualism.  
2. Fodor on Non-conceptualism 
Conceptualist and non-conceptualist positions have emerged in the debate 
on how to characterize the differences between propositional attitudes (such 
as beliefs and desires) on the one hand and perceptual experiences and 
states of informational processing systems on the other (Speaks, 2005; Ber-
múdez, 1995a; 1998; 2003). This debate takes as its starting point Evans’s 
influential idea that propositional attitudes have conceptual content, while 
perceptual experiences and the states of informational processing systems 
have non-conceptual content (Evans 1982). 
Fodor (1998a; 2007; 2008) adopts the conceptual/non-conceptual dis-
tinction shaped by the content view (Heck, 2000; 2007).3 According to the 
content view, the difference between states with non-conceptual content 
and states with conceptual content occurs exclusively at the content level 
(Bermúdez, 2007). Conceptual and non-conceptual content are different 
types of contents. Yet what does it mean, exactly, to say that conceptual and 
non-conceptual contents are different types of contents? Heck (2000; 2007) 
points out that what lies at the core of the debate between conceptualists 
and non-conceptualists is the structure of conceptual and non-conceptual 
content. 
In Fodor’s view, conceptual content has a characteristic structure con-
stituted by concepts understood as physically instantiated representations, 
whereas non-conceptual content is constituted by non-conceptual repre-
3 Within the conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate, there is also the state 
view (Heck, 2007). The state view is related to the conditions that a subject has to 
satisfy in order to be in a mental state with certain content (Skidelsky, 2010). What 
distinguishes conceptual states from non-conceptual states is that the former are 
concept-dependent while the latter are concept-independent (Bermúdez, 2007). A 
state is concept-dependent if it is impossible for a subject to be in a token mental 
state without possessing the concepts required to specify the content of that token 
state. In contrast, a state is concept-independent if the subject lacks all or some of 
the concepts required for an accurate specification of its content. See Laurier (2004) 
for more details. 
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sentations. In this sense, for example, the visual experience of a red table 
may have non-conceptual content since its content is not structured by 
concepts such as TABLE or RED.4 In contrast, Fodor (1998a) believes that 
propositional attitudes and thoughts in general have conceptual content. 
For instance, Helen is happy is a thought whose structured content can be 
expressed as follows: Fa (where a is Helen, F is happy). This thought is 
constituted by the concepts HELEN and HAPPY. 
Furthermore, according to Fodor (1998a), these concepts (e.g. HELEN 
and HAPPY) are mental particulars that constitute what Fodor (1975) calls 
LOT. In Fodor’s account, LOT is explained to be the inner symbolic format 
in which the mind represents concepts (Schneider, 2008). LOT concepts are 
understood to be the “words” (referred to as “symbols”) that are combined 
into mental sentences according to language-like principles (Schneider, 
2011). In Section 3, I will present the LOT hypothesis in greater detail. 
However, for now I would like to note that, according to Fodor, LOT con-
cepts can explain some properties of human thought. One of these proper-
ties is the productivity of thought. Over the course of their lifetime, normal 
humans seem to remain capable of entertaining an infinite number of new 
thoughts (Aizawa, 2003). It is a fact that any given human will entertain 
only a finite subset of all the possible thoughts she appears to be capable of 
entertaining (Fodor, 2004). However, this is a factual restriction, and in prin-
ciple, humans have the ability to entertain innumerable thoughts. Human 
thought also has a structural property called “systematicity” according to 
which we do not encounter people capable of having certain thoughts (e.g. 
The girl loves John) without having other related thoughts (e.g. John loves 
the girl) (Fodor 1998a). Human thought is systematic because the ability to 
have certain thoughts is intrinsically connected to the ability to have other 
related thoughts.5
4 I will hereafter use capital letters to express concepts and italics to express 
propositional attitudes and thoughts in general.
5 To some extent, Fodor’s systematicity of thought describes the same property of 
thought presented by Evans (1982) in the Generality Constraint: “If a subject can 
be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources 
for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which 
he has conception” (104). Still, there are important differences between Evans’s 
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Fodor’s productivity and systematicity of thought were inspired by the 
productivity and systematicity of natural language.6 Given that linguistic 
capacities are productive and systematic, and given that the function of 
natural language is to express our thoughts, Fodor (1987) concludes that 
human thought shares the same properties of language. He proposes compo-
sitionality as the best explanation for these properties of natural languages. 
There are an infinite number of utterable expressions and also certain sym-
metries of expressive power in natural languages due to the finite set of rep-
resentational primitives and the finite system of constructive principles that 
organize these primitives (Fodor, 2004). 
These representational primitives must make approximately the same 
semantic and syntactic contribution to each expression in which they occur 
(Fodor and Phylyshyn, 1988). For example, SAD is a representational prim-
itive which makes the same semantic and syntactic contribution to “John 
is sad” and to “Mary is sad.” Since these two expressions share the same 
primitive constituent (e.g. SAD), and since this primitive constituent makes 
the same semantic (refers to a certain property) and syntactic (it is an adjec-
tive) contribution, it can be said that these two expressions are systemati-
generality constraint and Fodor’s systematicity of thought. In Evans’s view, the 
generality constraint is not only true, it is necessarily true. According to this author, 
there simply could not be a subject who believes that Marie is happy and John is 
sad without being able to entertain the thoughts, Mary is sad and John is happy. 
Fodor, for his part, endorses the generality constraint as a contingent truth about 
actual thinkers. It is conceptually possible that there could be a subject who believes 
that Mary is happy and John is sad without being able to think that Mary is sad or 
John is happy. Nevertheless, Fodor (1998a) maintains that it is exceedingly unlikely 
that an actual thinker violates the generality constraint. On the other hand, the 
differences in the ontological commitments of Evans and Fodor are well-known. 
While Evans considers that concepts are abilities, Fodor considers them to be 
mental particulars. These remarks would need to be further explored; however, this 
brief exploration suffices for my purposes here. 
6 Note that in Fodor’s account, “The easiest way to understand what productivity 
and systematicity of cognitive capacities amount to is to focus on the productivity 
and systematicity of language comprehension and production” (Fodor and 
Phylyshyn, 1988, 119). 
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cally connected.7
The representational primitives that explain the systematicity of thought 
and its expressive powers are LOT concepts. Furthermore, the productiv-
ity and systematicity of thought depend on the compositionality of LOT 
symbols.8 Concepts are LOT’s primitives and have the capacity to combine 
compositionally. As LOT’s concepts can be combined and recombined com-
positionally, LOT explains the systematicity of thought.
Based on Fodor’s proposal, what exactly are non-conceptual representa-
tions? When Fodor introduces the notion of “non-conceptual representa-
tion,” he is thinking of iconic representations.9 He defines iconic representa-
tions following the picture principle: “If P is a picture of X, then parts of P 
are pictures of parts of X” (Fodor, 2008, 173; 2007, 108). The general idea 
appears to be that a representation R is iconic if every part of it represents a 
part of what R represents. As Balog (2009) illustrates, “a part of da Vinci’s 
Last Supper may represent a part of an apostle, or a table, or…etc.” (315). 
Notice that “part,” in this case, refers to a spatial part. 
7 Compositionality is conceived of both as a semantic and a syntactic property. A 
system of representations is semantically compositional if the semantic properties 
of the complex representation are fully determined by their structural descriptions 
together with the semantics of their primitive parts. On the other hand, a system 
of representations is syntactically compositional if the syntactic properties of 
the complex representation are fully determined by their structural descriptions 
together with the syntax of their primitive parts. See Fodor (2008).
8 Fodor (2001b) comes to believe that natural languages are not compositional. 
Assuming a pragmatic view of natural languages, Fodor (2001b) argues that 
compositionality would be a feature exclusive to thought. In agreement with Clapp 
(2010) I believe that Fodor is not able to allow this possibility. If natural languages 
are not compositional, then Fodor would not have good reasons to believe that 
thought certainly is. However, I will not discuss this topic since what is important in 
this context is the fact that thought is compositional. 
9 In fact, Fodor (2008) considers that “it’s in the nature of iconic representations 
not to be conceptual” (170). He contrasts iconic representations with discursive 
representations, which he conceives of as conceptual representations. Paradigmatic 
examples of iconic representations are pictures, just as paradigmatic examples of 
discursive representations are the sentences of natural language. See Fodor (2007; 
2008) for more details.
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Fodor (2007; 2008) considers that the early stages of perceptual process-
ing systems (such as visual and auditory systems) operate on this kind of 
iconic representation. According to Fodor’s (1983) taxonomy, the mind is 
divided into systems, some of which are modular and others of which are 
not. The main purpose of the modular systems is to provide the required 
information to the non-modular central systems. These central systems inte-
grate the output information already processed by the different modules for 
the purpose of belief fixation.
From Fodor’s point of view, non-conceptual representations, which are 
called “iconic representations,” are the representations upon which some 
of the components of perceptual modules operate. Unlike other defenders 
of non-conceptualism, Fodor considers that perceptual experiences require 
conceptual representations. He believes that inferring, thinking, and expe-
riencing all go in the same basket: “they all presuppose conceptualization” 
(Fodor, 2008, 185). Back to iconic representations, two main characteristics 
should be stressed. The first is related to the place of iconic representations 
in the cognitive economy. Since they are manipulated by the early compu-
tations of the perceptual modules, iconic representations are supposed to be 
“entirely subpersonal” (Fodor, 2008, 191). This implies that they cannot be 
introspected by the subject. Rather, “it appears to be that what can be intro-
spected is always the product of subpersonal and encapsulated inferences” 
(Fodor, 2008, 192). It has now become uncontroversial to say that subper-
sonal representations in general (and iconic representations in particular) 
are representations manipulated by the early stages of modular systems that 
cannot be accessed by the subject considered as a global system. 
Take David Marr’s theory of vision (1982). Marr’s theory constitutes one 
of the most developed information-processing theories that analyze vision 
in terms of a series of operations on data structures. The components of 
the visual system deliver a 3-D representation of the distal scene, taking 
the information extracted from the retinal image as a starting point. The 
initial filtering of the retinal image corresponds to edge detection, which 
is the information processing task of extracting information such as object 
boundaries (Shagrir, 2010). The retinal image represents an array of light 
intensities in the visual field. The detection of changes in these light intensi-
ties is a crucial part of the task needed to extract the objects’ boundaries. 
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Marr’s representational zero-crossings correspond to the registers of sudden 
changes in light intensity (Bermúdez, 1995b). I would like to emphasize 
that the subject is not able to access the information about changes in light 
intensities represented in Marr’s zero-crossing through introspection. These 
are primitive representations in the first stages of the visual system. What 
can be introspected is the representational output of the visual system, that 
is, the 3-D representation of a distal scene. This characterization of iconic 
representations has an epistemological consequence. According to Fodor 
(2008, 192), these representations are not available to justify one’s percep-
tual belief. This is because justification of one’s perceptual belief requires 
that the content of the iconic representations be introspected. Since this is 
not the case, due to its subpersonal nature, iconic representations are not 
available for perceptual beliefs. 
The second characteristic of iconic representations refers to their content. 
Iconic representations register only “sensory” or “transducer” detectible 
properties (Fodor, 2008, 186). According to Fodor (2008), “a mind can reg-
ister such properties as it has mechanisms for transducing.” (186) Transduc-
tion can be considered a very preliminary mechanism that takes ambient 
energy into mental representations. In the case of auditory perception, the 
properties transduced and represented by the iconic representations are 
those specified in a spectrogram, i.e. “the frequency, amplitude and duration 
of a sound” (Fodor, 2008, 186). In the case of visual perception, iconic rep-
resentations represent the kind of properties that photographs do, i.e. “two-
dimensional shape, shading, color, and so forth” (Fodor, 2008, 185). Iconic 
representations represent these kinds of properties but without any commit-
ment to principles of individuation. In the case of conceptual representa-
tions, the use of quantifiers, variables, singular terms, and sortal predicates 
helps to identify certain objects referred to by the representation. The use of 
these terms is related to the fact that conceptual representations have logical 
form. 
I will develop this characteristic of conceptual representations in more 
detail in the next section. However, to offer a brief example, John is blond 
is a conceptual representation in which the concept JOHN (expressed by the 
singular term “John”) reveals the ontological commitment with an individ-
ual named John. However, in the case of iconic representations, representa-
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tion and individuation are dissociated. For example, Marr’s representational 
zero-crossing which registers the sudden changes in light intensity does not 
individuate any object. Given that these representations are not constituted 
by quantifiers, variables, singular terms, etc. (necessary to pick up individu-
als and referential properties), they do not express an ontological commit-
ment. In this sense, the properties represented by iconic representations are 
properties that require a subpersonal process which does not participate in 
perceptual inferences. Perceptual inferences involve conceptual representa-
tions (Fodor, 2008, 185), and conceptual representations refer to properties 
individuated by their concepts. 
One might ask whether visual and auditory modules manipulate iconic 
representations in their early stages. As I reconstruct it, the argument 
offered by Fodor (2007, 2008) is as follows:10
(i) If perceptual modules do not exhibit what psychologists call “the 
item effect,” then they operate upon iconic representations.
(ii) Perceptual modules do not exhibit what psychologists call “the item 
effect.”
(iii) Therefore, perceptual modules operate upon iconic representations. 
Since this empirical argument for the existence of iconic representation in 
perceptual systems depends on the psychological phenomenon called “the 
item effect,” it could be baptized the “item effect argument.”11 The item 
effect is produced when the information is conceptually represented. As I 
have already mentioned, conceptualization involves individuation (Fodor, 
2008, 188). According to Fodor, “conceptualization is expensive” (2008, 
188) due to the fact that conceptual representations can differ in the number 
of individuals and properties that they represent. For example, the concep-
tual representation John, Mary, and Bill Clinton are happy individuates 
10 To the best of my knowledge, this is the only argument that Fodor (2007; 2008) 
presents for the existence of iconic representations.
11 Fodor (2008) remarks on the empirical nature of this argument: “The argument 
[…] is empirical; it suggests that there is iconic representation in perception, but 
certainly doesn’t demonstrate that there is” (189-90). 
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more individuals than the conceptual representation John is happy. How-
ever, what kind of computational effects are involved when conceptual rep-
resentations differ in the number of individuals they represent? The number 
of individuals represented by a conceptual representation is expressed by 
the number of informational items that the representation contains. In this 
sense, John, Mary, and Bill Clinton are happy involves more items (such as 
names) than John is happy. 
When the information is represented using conceptual resources, such 
as names and predicates, increased information will affect processing. The 
higher the number of informational items in a system, the longer the pro-
cesses required to extract information from an array of representations. 
For example, imagine you have the list of the students enrolled in a given 
course. Such a list provides you with characteristics of these students (e.g. 
age, hair color, weight, interests, etc.). Consider the processing involved in 
answering when asked whether any student in the course has blue eyes. 
Certainly, the more students there are in the course, the longer the pro-
cessing involved in answering the question because of the increase in the 
information. If the duration of processing depends on the quantity of infor-
mational items, then this constitutes evidence for the item effect, and such 
information is conceptually represented. 
However, these considerations do not apply when the information is 
represented by iconic representations. If processing involves a system of 
iconic representations, there will be no item effect. Nothing about iconic 
representations depends on the number of individuals, objects, or properties 
they represent, simply because iconic representations do not involve indi-
viduation (Fodor, 2008, 183). These representations contain information that 
does not individuate objects, individuals, or properties in the world. For this 
reason, iconic representation are not “expensive;” they have no ontological 
commitment. In this sense, with respect to ontological commitments, the 
iconic representation of a size is no different from that of a colored shape. 
Although these iconic representations may present different quantities of 
information, the processes that operate upon this information may be insen-
sitive to the amount of information. Imagine, in this case, that you take a 
picture of the students in the course mentioned above. You will be able to 
answer the question as to whether any student in the course has blue eyes 
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almost instantaneously. As Balog (2009) states, “the result times will be the 
same irrespective of whether there are 5 or 25 members” (317). The reason 
may be that iconic representations do not represent these members, they 
only carry sensory information. This would thus be an example in which 
the processes upon iconic representations do not exhibit the item effect.12
Fodor uses empirical evidence (Sperling, 1960; Julesz, 1971) to justify 
the claim that the early stages of visual and auditory systems do not exhibit 
the item effect and manipulate iconic representations. For example, the 
evidence presented by Julesz is related to the perception of different arrays 
of positioned dots that are visually presented. In the cases in which subjects 
were presented with different arrays of dots, they considered them to be 
positioned identically. Nevertheless, Fodor suggests that the displacement of 
the dots must somehow be registered since the sensory representation is the 
only information available to the subject about the stimulus. If this informa-
tion is not preserved, there can be no illusion (Balog, 2009). Fodor wants to 
emphasize that the number of dots presented to the subject does not affect 
the processing. The performance of the subject will be the same in cases in 
which more dots are presented. This would be a case where the item effect 
is disconfirmed and evidence is provided for the existence of iconic repre-
sentations. 
One way to debate Fodor’s iconic representation involves questioning his 
item effect argument. I maintain that Fodor’s processing load argument, 
presented in Concepts in favor of conceptual atomism, threatens his item 
effect argument. The processing load argument was introduced to counter 
the classical theory of concepts according to which concepts are structured 
12 Fodor (2008) considers that “the item effect is not the litmus for iconic 
representations” (184). In fact, he imagines a possible objection. A quick response to 
the argument for the existence of iconic representations would be to consider that 
the processes upon conceptual representations are parallel. In this case, the search 
for information extracted from the conceptual representations may not reveal 
the item effect because processes may not take longer when more information is 
encoded. Parallel processing avoids this kind of timing effects. To respond to this 
objection, Fodor (2008, 184) simply assumes that conceptual representations are 
computed serially. Serial processing is more likely to involve timing effects when it 
operates upon conceptual representations.
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mental representations that encode a set of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for their application (Laurence and Margolis, 1999). Furthermore, 
Fodor (1998a) uses this argument to try to defend his conceptual atomism. 
The argument can be reconstructed as a Reductio Ad Absurdum. It begins 
by considering concepts to be complex representations. This is the unten-
able hypothesis from which the absurd result will follow. It is important 
to stress that the next step of the processing load argument is based on the 
assumption that the amount of information computed affects the processes. 
In this step, Fodor assumes, as in the item effect argument, that the more 
information that is conceptually encoded, the longer and heavier the pro-
cesses. Following this idea, a further step would be to state that the process-
ing of a more complex conceptual representation will take longer than the 
processing of a less complex conceptual representation. The reason is that 
a more complex representation carries more information. For example, the 
processes that operate on DIE are supposedly faster than those that operate 
on KILL. The reason may be that the structure of KILL is more complex 
than the structure of DIE, since KILL includes information such as CAUSE 
and DIE (Laurence and Margolis, 1999). However, Fodor argues that psy-
chologists were not able to measure this timing difference in the processing 
of concepts such as KILL or DIE. This leads to the problematic situation 
in which the timing effects that were expected to happen never occur. This 
problematic situation brings Fodor to the conclusion that concepts are not 
structured representations. 
However, the processing load argument can be interpreted as revealing 
something different: there is no reason to assume that the speed of com-
putations is affected by the amount of information processed, even if the 
information is conceptually encoded (Jackendoff, 1983). Instead of position-
ing the processing load argument against the classical theory of concepts, it 
could be placed in opposition to the item effect argument. In this case, the 
conclusion of the argument would not be focused on the structure of con-
ceptual representations. As Fodor (1998a) has presented it, the processing 
load argument can conclude that it is not true that the more information that 
is conceptually encoded, the longer and heavier the processes. As this idea 
leads to the conflicting scenario in which the expected timing effects never 
happen, it has to be abandoned. I suggest that this assumption would be the 
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one that is denied in the Reductio Ad Absurdum. 
Moreover, in which sense would the assumption that more information 
being conceptually encoded involves longer and heavier processes be false? 
It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that concepts are the representa-
tions needed for categorization tasks. Categorization is a complex cogni-
tive capacity that involves classifying an object under a certain category 
(Machery, 2009). Psychologists usually organize categories on three levels: 
the superordinate level (e.g. animal), the subordinate level (e.g. Rottweiler), 
and the basic level (e.g. dog). The basic level of categorization is an inter-
mediate level of abstraction in which objects are grouped together based on 
their form and function. This level of abstraction is of particular interest in 
psychological research. Any given object can fall under many different cat-
egories. For example, a single object can be an animal, a Rottweiler and a 
dog. What Rosch (1999) and her colleagues have discovered is that subjects 
identify an object as a dog (basic level) faster than they can identify it as 
an animal (superordinate level) or as a Rottweiler (subordinate level). This 
phenomenon is called the “basic level effect.” 
Deeper insight into the basic level effect reveals that a subject’s reaction 
times in categorization tasks which involve the basic level are faster than 
a subject’s reaction times in a categorization task which involves the other 
levels. To illustrate this point, we can consider the tasks in which the sub-
ject has to identify a category. Subjects are presented with a series of sen-
tences (e.g. “Dogs are mammals,” “Dogs are animals,” etc.) and they have 
to answer with a categorization judgment (true/false). Bearing in mind that 
concepts are the mental representations needed for this kind of task, and 
assuming that the concepts are complex representations, this kind of experi-
ment shows that the information in basic level concepts is used faster than 
that contained in superordinate and subordinate concepts. However, the 
conceptual representations of the basic level have, in fact, more information 
than the rest of the conceptual representations. When subjects are asked to 
list the features of each of these conceptual representations, they generally 
give more information about the basic level concepts.13 As Rosch (1999) has 
13 Could self-report count as evidence to support that basic level category 
representations carry more information? Someone who does not trust the evidence 
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asserted, the superordinate and subordinate concepts include less informa-
tion in their structures because they refer to few properties that objects have 
in common. This difference in information is due to a difference on the 
ontological commitments of these concepts. Concepts like DOG individuate 
more in the world than concepts like ANIMAL. Certainly, I am not claim-
ing that DOG represents more individuals than ANIMAL. Individuation is a 
complex metaphysical relation which involves the reference to individuals, 
objects, or properties in the world. In this sense, concepts like DOG track 
more properties in the world (e.g. having a tail, being four-legged, etc.) 
than concepts like ANIMAL. The lesson is that even if we agree that there 
are (conceptual) representations that have a great deal of information in 
their structure (basic level concepts), their processing does not take longer. 
Instead, these representations are processed faster than other kinds of repre-
sentations with less information (superordinate and subordinate concepts). 
The example about categorization considered above contradicts Fodor’s 
idea presented in the item effect argument, revealing that the timing of cog-
nitive processes on conceptual representations is not always affected by the 
amount of information.14 
3. The Trilemma
Although I have presented a reason for questioning the soundness of the 
item effect argument in Section 2, in this section I will assume that it does, 
in fact, hold true. I will then proceed to show the strong tension between 
the notion of “non-conceptual representation” and CTM. This tension is 
presented in the form of a trilemma. I will explore the following options: 
first, that perceptual modules operate on non-conceptual representations and 
on LOT conceptual representations; second, that the only representations 
manipulated by the perceptual modules are non-conceptual ones; and third, 
delivered by self-reports would question this assertion. Nevertheless, this exceeds 
the present argument. For my present purpose, it is enough to consider what 
cognitive psychologists usually do in their field, and they generally use self-report 
to obtain psychological evidence. 
14 Processes may be affected by the organization of the conceptual information. 
For more details, see Destéfano (2012) and Jackendoff (1983). 
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that perceptual modules include both non-conceptual representations and 
other representations that are not full-blown LOT. Below, I will explore the 
problems of each of these options.  
3.1. Non-conceptual Representations and LOT
In the first horn of the trilemma, I propose considering that perceptual 
modules compute non-conceptual representation and LOT conceptual rep-
resentations. I believe that perceptual modules can operate on these kinds 
of representations in two different ways. First, it is possible to speculate 
that the early stages of perceptual processing operate on non-conceptual 
representations, whereas the final stages of perceptual processing operate on 
LOT representations. For instance, Marr’s theory of vision (1982) includes 
three different levels of representations: the primal sketch, which represents 
light intensities of the image; the 2½-D sketch, which contains informa-
tion related to the viewer; and the 3-D sketch, which has visual informa-
tion related to the object. To say that perceptual modules operate on non-
conceptual and LOT representations could be interpreted as the idea that the 
primal sketch, in Marr’s account, includes non-conceptual representations, 
while 2½-D and 3-D sketches include LOT representations. Another option 
would be to consider that there are non-conceptual and LOT representa-
tions in the different stages of perceptual processing. In this case, to say 
that perceptual modules compute non-conceptual representations and LOT 
conceptual representations would mean that the primal sketch, the 2½-D 
sketch, and the 3-D sketch all operate both on non-conceptual and LOT rep-
resentations. The aforementioned options do not affect the development of 
this horn of the trilemma. 
Fodor (1975) introduced the LOT hypothesis as a proposal concerning 
the vehicle of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are usually 
expressed with the formula “X believes (desires, etc.) that…” which can 
be completed with a declarative sentence. Bertrand Russell (1921) called 
these mental states “propositional attitudes” due to the fact that they can 
be described as the attitudes of a subject (e.g. belief, desire, etc.) toward a 
proposition. To illustrate this point, the sentence “John believes that Ken 
Loach is a good director” expresses John’s mental state, which consists of 
his belief that Ken Loach is a good director. This sentence can be analyzed 
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as follows: there is a subject (John, in this case) who has an attitude (here, 
of belief) toward a content propositionally expressed (Ken Loach is a good 
director). 
As I explained in Section 2, Fodor considers that propositional attitudes 
have conceptual content, and he endorses the idea that conceptual content 
is constituted by LOT representations. LOT is supposed to be a symbolic 
format in which the mind represents concepts that are different from the 
natural language words used to express these concepts. It is true that LOT 
is not primarily concerned with the nature of modular processes. Originally, 
the LOT hypothesis was formulated for the domain of thinking.  However, 
Fodor himself suggests that “modular input systems have their own LOT” 
(Schneider, 2008,7). Moreover, he suggests that perceptual modules com-
pute LOT representations:
This emphasis upon the syntactical character of the thought suggests a 
view of cognitive processes in general- including, for example percep-
tion, […]- as occurring in a language-like medium, a sort of “language 
of thought”. This too is a thesis for which I am enthusiastic. (1997, 9)
LOT representations have combinatorial syntax and semantics (Fodor and 
Phylyshyn, 1988, 98). This means that (i) there is a distinction between 
atomic and molecular representations; (ii) the structurally molecular repre-
sentations have syntactic constituents that are themselves either atomic or 
molecular; and (iii) the semantic content of a molecular representation is 
a function of the semantic contents of its syntactic constituents. It is these 
properties which give LOT representations their logical form. The notion of 
“logical form” has been developed both from a philosophical and a linguis-
tic point of view (Carruthers, 2003). From the philosophical perspective, 
the logical form of a sentence consists of a syntactic construction with logi-
cal constants, quantifiers, variables, and singular terms. From the linguistic 
point of view, the logical form is a syntactically structured representation 
that constitutes the output of the linguistic computational system. The logi-
cal form together with the phonetic form provide the instructions to the 
performance systems (Chomsky, 1995). 
Beyond the question of how the logical form is described, it is impor-
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tant to note that it can only be extracted from representations which have 
canonical decomposition. If Helen is happy has the logical form Fa, this 
is because this representation has a canonical description of its symbols. 
The canonical description of Helen is happy would be ((Helen)NP ((is)
V (happy)P)VP)S. This description establishes the canonical constituents of 
Helen is happy. It is decomposed into singular terms and predicates, such 
as Helen and is happy. Each decomposition of the representation reveals 
the same singular terms and predicates, and these components are therefore 
called “canonical constituents.” This description also discards constituents 
that are not canonical, such as Helen is. In addition, the canonical descrip-
tion reveals the hierarchical relations between the canonical constituents of 
Helen is happy. Since the representation is constituted by canonical com-
ponents, they are combined according to each of the components’ canonical 
roles. Each of these constituents makes a different syntactic contribution 
to the whole representation. For instance, the contribution of Helen, con-
ceived as the head of the Noun Phrase, is different from the contribution of 
is, understood as the head of the Verbal Phrase. To summarize, the logical 
form reveals the hierarchical relations between the canonical components 
of a representation. 
Now, Fodor’s defense of CTM is well-known. As the author himself 
points out, CTM is part of the truth about cognition (Fodor, 2001a). Gener-
ally speaking, CTM holds that minds can be conceived of as computing 
systems. The view that cognition has something to do with computation 
was developed by different research traditions (Piccinini, 2012). All of them 
have a common feature: they attempt to explain mental phenomena by 
recurring to mental computations (Piccinini, 2007). CTM claims that com-
putation is a special kind of process with characteristics that are relevant 
in the explanation of mental phenomena (Piccinini, 2007). Moreover, com-
putational explanations of cognitive capacities take the form of computer 
programs to produce the capacity in question (Piccinini, 2012). 
Fodor’s CTM was inspired by Alan Turing (1950), who defined computa-
tion in terms of the formal manipulation of uninterpreted symbols accord-
ing to algorithms. These algorithms constitute the instructions needed to 
generate a result within a finite number of steps. Beyond Turing’s original 
ideas, Fodor maintains a semantic view of computation (Piccinini, 2012). 
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Fodor’s CTM, when supplemented with the LOT hypothesis, holds that a 
cognitive process is a computational process involving the manipulation of 
semantically interpretable strings of symbols which are processed according 
to algorithms. In other words, a computational process consists of the pro-
cessing of representations (Fodor, 1975; 1997; Fodor and Phylyshyn, 1988; 
Schneider, 2008). Fodor (2008) asserts:
Tokens of mental processes are “computations”, that is, causal chains 
of […] operations on mental representations. There is no tokening of a 
(cognitive) mental state or process (by a creature, at a time) unless there 
is a corresponding tokening of a mental representation (by a creature, 
at a time). (5-6)
 
In addition, these syntactic operations preserve the semantic properties of 
the representations. Nevertheless, classical computational processes are 
exclusively defined over the syntactic structure of the representations in 
the sense that they are causally sensitive only to the constituent structure 
of the symbols. Mental operations compute a symbol string, transforming 
it into another symbol string based on its structural or canonical descrip-
tion. Consider the logical operation in which you infer P from (P.Q). The 
transformation of (P.Q) into P is based on the form of these symbols. These 
same considerations apply to mental operations. The mental processes that 
transform (P.Q) into P operate on the structural description of the computed 
representations. Thus, computational processes transform the representa-
tions according to the logical form that expresses the structural or canonical 
description of these representations:
The logical form of a thought supervenes on the syntax of the cor-
responding mental representation, and the logical form of a thought 
determines its causal powers because the syntax of a mental representa-
tion determines its computational role. (Fodor, 2001a, 19)
In this view, CTM requires language-like representations because “only 
something that is language-like can have logical form” (Fodor, 2008, 21). 
In classical computationalism, only something that is syntactically struc-
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tured in logical form can be computed. This means that CTM requires LOT 
language-like representations. The problem with non-conceptual representa-
tions is that they do not have the properties of language-like representations. 
One of the most important characteristics of non-conceptual representations 
is the fact that they do not have logical form because they decompose into 
syntactically and semantically homogeneous parts. In other words, these 
representations do not possess canonical decomposition into names, singu-
lar terms, etc. Pictures and graphs can decompose in many different ways, 
creating new components each time. A picture, for example, can be cut up 
in endless ways, none more canonical than another. This means that neither 
pictures (in particular) nor non-conceptual representations (in general) have 
canonical constituents. Due to the fact that any new decomposition gives 
rise to a new set of components, these components cannot be canonical con-
stituents. On the contrary, these components would merely be parts of the 
representation. Indeed, the parts of a non-conceptual representation can be 
combined. For example, the parts of a picture can be combined in order to 
represent someone’s face. Nevertheless, these combinations are only estab-
lished between mere parts of the representations. Since the components 
combined are not canonical constituents, non-conceptual representations 
cannot be canonically combined, and thus, the compositionality that they 
present is not enough to consider them language-like representations.
In summary, non-conceptual representations do not have the syntactic 
properties needed by the computational processes of the mind. As CTM 
requires LOT language-like representations, and non-conceptual repre-
sentations are not language-like, CTM does not apply to non-conceptual 
representations. If non-conceptual representations do not have logical form, 
then part of the processes and representations that figure in the perceptual 
modules cannot be explained with Fodor’s CTM. Of course, the processes 
that operate on LOT representations would satisfy CTM’s constraints, but 
this consideration does not apply to the non-conceptual representations 
included in perceptual modules. These representations do not satisfy CTM’s 
constraints. This imposes a limitation on CTM which, to the best of my 
knowledge, Fodor has not considered. The presence of non-conceptual rep-
resentations weakens the explanatory power of CTM related to the working 
of the modules. I will return to this idea in Section 3.2. Furthermore, Fodor 
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undermines his personal goal of developing a cognitive science focused on 
CTM. He would be forced to turn to a non-classical computational expla-
nation or to a non-computational explanation related to the operations that 
manipulate non-conceptual representations. Thus, if perceptual modules 
operate on both non-conceptual and LOT representations, Fodor would 
have to accept that part of the perceptual modules is not explained in classi-
cal computational terms. 
3.2. Non-conceptual Representations without LOT 
According to the second horn of the trilemma, there is an option by which 
the very early, middle, and advanced stages of perceptual processing oper-
ate solely on non-conceptual representations. Since Fodor generally rejects 
“hybrid models” of representations (Schneider, 2008, 7), it is possible to 
think that perceptual modules compute non-conceptual representations 
without any presence of LOT representations. However, this scenario would 
exacerbate the problem presented on the previous horn of the trilemma. 
The perceptual information processing systems would manipulate repre-
sentations whose characteristics are not compatible with the representations 
needed by the computational processes postulated by CTM. 
It is important to remember that non-conceptual representations do not 
have a logical form to express the syntactic structure needed in order for 
a representation to be computed. In this case, CTM would be absolutely 
useless in explaining how the perceptual modules work. Indeed, this is an 
undesirable consequence because Fodor (2001a) considers that the explana-
tory success of CTM lies in the modules. Fodor ascribes both an optimistic 
and a pessimistic aspect to CTM. The pessimistic aspect consists of the idea 
that CTM does not apply to the central systems that operate for the purpose 
of belief fixation:
So, then, when I wrote books about what a fine thing CTM is, I gener-
ally made it a point to include a section saying that I don’t suppose that 
it could comprise more than a fragment of a full and satisfactory cog-
nitive psychology; and that the most interesting- certainly the hardest- 
problem about thinking is unlikely to be much illuminated by any kind 
of computational theory we are able now to imagine. (Fodor, 2001a, 1)
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However, CTM also has a positive aspect that makes it the best cognitive 
perspective to study Fodorian modules:
It’s a central theme in The Language of Thought (1975) that modular 
cognition is where Turing’s computational story about mental processes 
is most likely to be true. (Fodor, 2001a, 7)
Why does Fodor insist that “there’s more to thinking than computing” (2008, 
22)? Why does he believe that CTM is not the correct approach to explain 
the overall working of central systems? It is important to bear in mind that 
the central systems operate for the purpose of belief fixation. Belief fixation 
involves all the non-demonstrative inferences needed to establish the sim-
plicity, coherence, and conservatism of a belief system. Let’s take the non-
demonstrative inferences for simplicity. Suppose that you have a punctuate 
system of belief constituted by P, and you are considering also endorsing 
either the belief that Q or the belief that R. The question is, then, which is 
the simpler belief system? P.Q or P.R? 
Certainly, the central systems have the processes required to answer this 
question. To evaluate the simplicity of these two belief systems, the pro-
cesses must be global, that is, they must be “defined over more or less the 
whole system of background beliefs” (Fodor, 2008, 121). The processes 
for simplicity are global because they are sensitive to the global proper-
ties of the beliefs, where these global properties of beliefs are supposed 
to be determined by the nature of the larger group of beliefs with which 
the belief is entertained (Schneider, 2011). For instance, the computation 
required to evaluate simplicity between P.Q and P.R must be sensitive to the 
properties that P.Q or P.R possess as such. The overall simplicity cannot be 
evaluated by simply analyzing the intrinsic simplicities of each belief that 
belongs to the system. Whether P.Q is simpler than P.R is not a function of 
the simplicity of P, the simplicity of Q, and the simplicity of R considered 
individually. In fact, as Fodor (2008) states, “there is no such thing as the 
intrinsic simplicity of a belief” (121). This is a property of the belief system 
that must be evaluated considering the constituents of the system relation-
ally in tandem. 
The limit of CTM is that “Computation is, by stipulation, a process that is 
205Fodor’s Non-Conceptual Representations and the Computational Theory~
sensitive to the syntax of the representation and nothing else” (Fodor, 2008, 
124). Fodor claims that:
Computation as our current cognitive science understands it, is an 
intrinsically local process, when a computation “looks at” a represen-
tation in its domain, what it is able to “see”, or to operate upon, is the 
identity and arrangement of its constituents. (2008, 107)
Fodor’s remark reveals that CTM proposes cognitive processes which are 
sensitive to the local properties of a representation X, properties which are 
“ipso facto independent of the properties of anything except X” (Fodor, 
2008, 107-108). As the constitutive structure of the representation is one of 
its local properties, the process that computes it is only sensitive to the con-
stitutive structure of this representation. However, as we have already seen, 
the central processes that determine simplicity, coherence, etc., are sensitive 
to something other than the syntax of the representation. They are sensitive 
to global properties, and global properties do not supervene on syntactic 
properties, which are intrinsic properties. As I mentioned above, the global 
properties of beliefs depend exclusively on the relations between the differ-
ent beliefs of a system.15
Fodor maintains that modular systems do not share this problem with 
central systems. The reason is that modules are supposed to compute rep-
resentations through processes sensitive to the syntax of the representation. 
However, if there are non-conceptual representations in the perceptual mod-
ules, then the perceptual modules share the following difficulty presented in 
the case of central systems: neither of them (perceptual modules and cen-
tral systems) can be explained by CTM. For different reasons, the processes 
of both the central and the modular systems are sensitive to something that 
is not the syntax of the representation, “which is to say that they aren’t 
15 I have introduced some aspects of the globality argument, but left aside the 
relevance argument. I concentrate on the former because I believe that this brief 
exploration suffices for my present purposes. For a detailed presentation of the 
relevance argument, which is another refutation of a computational approach to 
central systems, see Fodor (2001a; 2008), Schneider (2011), and Samuels (in press).
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computations in the sense of the term that CTM endorses” (Fodor, 2008, 
112). It is important to bear in mind that perceptual modules include non-
conceptual representations, which do not have the constitutive structure of 
LOT representations. Of course, these representations are processed some-
how, but they are not computed in the sense of CTM.  
If we delve deeper into this issue, the problem of globality does not seem 
to be connected to the workings of perceptual modules. I hold that processes 
which operate upon non-conceptual representations are not sensitive to the 
global properties of these representations, but are instead defined over some 
of the local properties of these representations. As Fodor (2008) claims, 
the part-whole relation is a paradigmatic local property that something 
can exhibit. For example, the right hand of John is a local property owned 
by this individual and this property is “independent of how the things in 
the rest of the world are” (Fodor, 2008, 108). The fact that local properties 
have a mereological characterization makes me think that non-conceptual 
representations have local properties and that processes operate upon these 
properties. Non-conceptual representations are characterized through the 
notion of “iconic representation,” and iconic representations are constituted 
by parts. 
Generally speaking, the visual system cannot register the properties 
of a certain image without registering parts of the image. In Section 2, I 
introduced a few aspects of Marr’s vision theory (1982). I mentioned that, 
according to Marr, visual analysis takes the retinal image as its starting 
point; the retinal image is an array of light intensities in the visual field 
produced by the activity of the photoreceptors (Shagrir, 2010). It is neces-
sary to detect the changes of these light intensities in order to extract the 
information of the retinal image, such as the structure of the image, object 
boundaries, etc. The processes that underlie the detection of changes in light 
intensities operate on the local geometry of the image (Marr, 1982). They 
process each intensity value of the array of lights locally conceived. For this 
reason, these processes can be said to be sensitive to the local properties of 
the image. 
However, these processes share one aspect with the central system’s pro-
cesses: they do not operate upon the syntactic properties proposed by CTM. 
Perceptual processes are sensitive to a mereological property that is absent 
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in the case of conceptual representations. To be sure, conceptual represen-
tations have a mereological characterization because they have constitu-
ents. Yet, “Constituents aren’t just any parts of a representation, they’re its 
canonical parts” (Fodor, 2008, 109). The local properties of non-conceptual 
representations are therefore not enough to consider them under the domain 
of CTM. This would be an absolutely pessimistic scenario for classical com-
putationalism. It would further exacerbate the explanatory limitations of 
CTM. In fact, it would cancel the explanatory need of CTM, since it would 
not explain how perceptual modules work. Therefore, if perceptual modules 
only compute non-conceptual representations, CTM would then not explain 
how the perceptual modules work. This poses a serious challenge to Fodor’s 
explanation of modular processes with CTM. 
3.3. Non-conceptual Representations and Deflated LOT
The third horn of the trilemma refers to the possibility that perceptual mod-
ules compute non-conceptual representations jointly with other representa-
tions that are not full-blown LOT. As in the case of the first horn, two possi-
bilities are conceivable. First, the early stages of perceptual processing may 
compute non-conceptual representations while the rest of the perceptual 
processes compute representations that are not full-blown LOT. Second, 
every stage of the perceptual modules could compute both non-conceptual 
representations and representations that are not full-blown LOT. 
In this scenario, propositional attitudes would have a full-blown LOT, 
whereas perceptual modules would have representations that are not full-
blown LOT (Aydede 2010). This difference would be a matter of degree 
(Schneider, 2008). The idea that certain representations do not constitute 
full-blown LOT could be interpreted in several ways. According to the first 
sense, a representation that is not a full blown LOT fails to present logical 
form. As a result, neither of the representations upon which the early stages 
of perceptual processing operate would have logical form. The reason for 
this is that neither non-conceptual representations nor representations that 
are not full-blown LOT would have the syntactic characteristics required 
for the logical form. They do not decompose into singular terms, predicates, 
etc. This hypothetical scenario would present the same difficulties found in 
the second horn of the trilemma, according to which perceptual modules 
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would not fulfill the requirements of CTM. This would be an undesirable 
end for the classical computational explanation supported by Fodor in order 
to explain how the modules work. 
Still, let’s imagine another way to deflate the notion of “LOT.” In this sec-
ond sense, a representation that is not a full-blown LOT would present an 
incomplete combinatorial syntax and incomplete compositional semantics. 
First, the existence of an incomplete combinatorial syntax means that the 
items of this not full-blown LOT cannot be combined with certain other 
items. For instance, it is well established that a full-blown LOT item like 
HELEN, which has the syntactic function of being the head of a Noun 
Phrase, can be combined with another item like IS, which can serve as the 
head in a Verbal Phrase. However, let’s imagine that the not full-blown item 
HELEN* does not allow this combination. Second, incomplete composi-
tional semantics mean that there are instances in which an atomic item con-
tributes a different meaning to the content of the complex representation. 
For example, a case could be conceived of in which the not full-blown LOT 
item HAPPY* makes a different semantic contribution in John is happy 
and in Helen is happy. This would not occur with the full-blown LOT item 
HAPPY. In spite of this, these LOT representations would have some kind 
of syntactic and semantic structure. Nevertheless, perceptual modules still 
compute non-conceptual representations, and this causes the problems of 
the first horn of the trilemma. A part of the perceptual modules would not 
be explainable in classical computational terms. Regarding this first horn of 
the trilemma, one might object that, contrary to what I argue, it seems that 
Fodor is completely aware of CTM limitations in this respect. This objector 
could imagine that Fodor (2008) affords the first horn of the trilemma when 
he states that: 
The question how (for example, by what computational processes) 
unconceptualized iconic representation might get ‘collected under a 
concept’ is of course, very hard; and the answer is unknown for practi-
cally any of the interesting cases. (194)
However, this quotation shows that Fodor is aware of a different limitation 
of non-conceptual representations. The problem of how the information 
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of non-conceptual representations might fall under a certain concept is not 
intrinsically connected with the problem that, accepting non-conceptual 
representations, part of the perceptual modules is not explainable with 
CTM. How to relate conceptual and non-conceptual representations is a 
question that is shared by all non-conceptualists. This includes both the non-
conceptualists from the computational research tradition, such as Fodor, and 
the non-conceptualists that do not belong to this tradition. My concern in 
the first horn of the trilemma is to show a specific limitation that Fodor has 
when we try to match his non-conceptualism with his CTM. 
Thus, to conclude, if perceptual modules compute non-conceptual repre-
sentations and representations that are not full-blown LOT, then this implies 
the same difficulties presented for the first and the second horns of the tri-
lemma. 
4. Conclusion: You Can’t Have Them Both, But You Refuse to Give 
Them up.
In his most recent publications, Fodor (2007; 2008) seems to accept that the 
very early stages of perceptual processing operate upon non-conceptual rep-
resentations, particularly iconic representations. The main purpose of this 
paper has been to show the tension between his defense of non-conceptual 
representations and his traditional adscription to CTM. If Fodor supports 
CTM and states, as he has in the past, that the explanatory success of CTM 
is related to the modules, then he has to abandon the notion of “non-con-
ceptual representation” in the case of modular perceptual processing. These 
representations cannot be used for a classical computational explanation. 
His computational approach requires representations with properties that he 
believes non-conceptual representations do not possess. At the same time, if 
Fodor defends the existence of non-conceptual representations, he would be 
forced to reject CTM.
Some may think that the tension between the notion of “non-conceptual 
representation” and CTM only appears when we consider iconic repre-
sentations to be pictures. As I stated in note 9, Fodor (2008) assumes that 
pictures are paradigmatic examples of iconic representations. My reading 
of what iconic representations are follows Fodor’s assumption very closely. 
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However, pictures are not the only examples of iconic representations. For 
instance, Fodor (2008) also admits that “graphs are icons according to [his] 
usage” (174). As there exists literature on whether non-conceptual represen-
tations can have the structure of maps (Camp, 2007), it is worth consider-
ing whether Fodor’s iconic representations could be conceived as maps. Is 
the appeal to some such notion of “iconic representation” compatible with 
the possibility of CTM?16 I believe that if Fodor considers iconic represen-
tations to be maps he is not in a better position. My opinion is that maps 
present the same difficulties as pictures for explanation in classical compu-
tational terms. In what follows, I want to briefly present my reasons. 
According to Camp (2007), cartographic representational systems (e.g. 
maps) are constructed from discrete formal elements that are combined 
according to combinatorial principles. The formal elements used in maps 
are “quite indirect and arbitrary” (Camp, 2007, 158). For example:
On many maps any solid line of a certain width signifies a street, any 
blue line or blob signifies a river or lake, any cross signifies a church 
[…], four-lane highways [are represented] with a red line, state capitals 
with a star, and cities by their names. (Camp, 2007, 154-158) 
Since maps exploit an isomorphism of spatial structure with their repre-
sented domain, their formal elements are combined following “principles 
of spatial isomorphism” (Camp, 2007, 158). Further, the representational 
importance of the entire map is a function of the way in which those ele-
ments are spatially combined. For example:
If two lines intersect, with a blob in one quadrant and a cross in the 
other […] then this represents two intersecting streets with a church 
across from a pond. By contrast, if the two lines are drawn in parallel, 
with the cross above the blob […] then these same elements represent a 
different but related situation, in which a church is north of a pond and 
between two parallel roads. (Camp, 2007, 154) 
16 Thanks to one of my referees for pressing this worry. 
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This leads us to the idea that maps do not have the properties of LOT lan-
guage-like representations required by CTM. It is true that the fact that the 
formal elements of maps are combined following principles of spatial iso-
morphism means that maps have a mereological characterization in which 
parts of the representation can be found. However, this mereological char-
acterization is not enough to consider maps as having the constitutive struc-
ture of LOT representations. Just like pictures, cartographic representational 
systems show a kind of part-whole relation that is absent in the case of LOT 
language-like representations. They show a part-whole relation in which it 
is relevant to relate the elements with a spatial criteria (e.g. X is north of Y, 
X crosses Y, X is in parallel to Y). In this part-whole relation, it would be 
difficult to consider the formal elements as canonical constituents. If formal 
elements of maps were canonical constituents, there would be hierarchical 
relations between them that would permit predication. Nevertheless, talking 
about maps’ icons, Camp (2007) states that “one couldn’t legitimately intro-
duce icons with predicative force, to represent properties like being happy, 
being bald, or loving” (166). This means that the icons used in maps are not 
canonical constituents that enable the maps to express predicative relations. 
Without canonical constituents, cartographic representational systems are 
far from replicating the property of having logical form presented in LOT 
language-like representations. It is important to remember that the logical 
form of LOT representations expresses the hierarchical relations between 
the canonical constituent of that representation. Without such character-
ization, maps, like pictures, would not be explainable in classical compu-
tational terms. In summary, even if we interpret iconic representations as 
maps, there would still be tension between this kind of representation and 
CTM.
The problem is that Fodor would like to keep both the notion of “non-
conceptual representation” and CTM. He would like to keep CTM because 
he considers that classical computationalism is the best option for a psycho-
logical explanation (Fodor, 1968). On the other hand, he would like to keep 
iconic representations because he believes they fit with the empirical data 
concerning the workings of the early stages of perceptual modules (Fodor 
2007; 2008). However, to keep both of these notions, Fodor is forced to 
impose some change on his theorization. One option would involve modi-
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fying his notion of “computation” to accept that algorithms can operate on 
representations which are not language-like. This is perfectly true when 
we focus on the notion of “algorithm.” As Piccinini (2012) defines it, “An 
algorithm is an effective, step-by-step procedure that manipulates strings 
of symbols and generates a result within finitely many steps” (20). Accord-
ing to Piccinini (2012), an “algorithm” is an inclusive notion that does 
not require that the vehicles being manipulated be language-like. Another 
option would be to rework Fodor’s notion of “non-conceptual representa-
tion” assuming that these kinds of representations have the characteristics 
of the language-like representations. Neither of these possibilities is an easy 
fix. Fodor (2001a) admits that coherence is not a real virtue. Still, I believe 
that Fodor would be hard-pressed to respond to the difficulties evidenced 
by the trilemma.   
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